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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
NATIONAL POLICE POWER UNDER THE POSTAL
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
IF ONE were asked to explain and illustrate the doctrine of
implied powers as it has functioned in the development of our
constitutional law, there would probably be no easier way to do
it than to point to the enormous expansion of the postal power
of Congress.' The clause in the federal constitution which grants
to Congress the power "to establish Post Offices and Post
Roads"2 was inserted there -almost without discussion.3 It seems
to have appeared entirely innocuous even to the most suspicious
and skeptical of those who feared that the new government would
dangerously expand its powers at the expense of the states and
the individual.4 And yet that government had hardly been set
in operation before this brief grant of aufhority began to be
subjected to a liberal and expansive construction under which
our postal system has come to be our most picturesque symbol
of the length and breadth and strength of national authority.5
1 The subject of the expansion of the postal power of Congress has
been fully treated in a very excellent monograph by Lindsay Rogers
entitled "The Postal Power of Congress," Johns Hopkins' University Stu-
dies in Historical and Political Science, 1916. The writer has drawn
freely upon Professor Rogers' researches in the preparation of this article.
2 Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 7.
3 In its present form it was not debated at all. In the New Jersey
Plan introduced into the Convention by Paterson on June 15 it was pro-
posed to allow Congress to raise revenue, among other ways, "by a post-
age on all letters or packages passing through the general Post Office."
Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, I, 243. The history of the
postal clause in the convention is traced in Rogers, op. cit., 23. It throws
no light on the present problem.
4 Madison, in the 42nd number of the Federalist, dismissed the subject
with the statement, "The power of establishing post roads, must, in every
view, be a harmles power; and may, perhaps, by judicious management,
become productive of great conveniency."
5 "Under that six-word grant of power the great postal system of this
country has been built up, involving an annual revenue and expenditure of
over five hundred millions of dollars, the maintenance of 60,000 post
offices, with -hundreds of thousands of employees, the carriage of more
than fifteen billions of pieces of mail matter per year, weighing over two
billions of pounds, the incorporation of railroads, the establishment of the
rural free delivery system, the money order system, by which more than
half a billion of dollars a year is transmitted from person to person, the
postal savings bank, the parcel post, an aeroplane mail service, the sup-
pression of lotteries, and a most efficient suppression of fraudulent and
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This expansion of national authority under the postal power
given to Congress Has proceeded along two distinct but related
lines. There has been, in the first place, a striking expansion of
what may be called the collectivist or socialistic functions carried
on through the post office.6 Here may be mentioned such enter-
prises as the postal money order systeri, the postal savings bank,
the parcel post, and the use of the post office as an agency of
publicity to aid in the marketing of farm products and in solving
the problem of unemployment. In some countries, of course, the
scope of the collectivist functions delegated to the post office
is much broader than in the United States; but it seems highly
probable that the American postal system has by no means
reached the limit of its growth as an agency for positive service
to the people.7 This interesting subject is not, however, the one
under consideration in this article. In the second place, national
authority under the postal power has developed in striking meas-
ure along the line of repression and regulation effected by the
denial or forfeiture of postal privileges. Acting on the theory
that the hand which bestows privileges may also withhold them,
Congress has wielded the power of exclusion from the mails
with a vigorous arm. It has refused to carry in the mailsaa long
list of articles injurious in themselves or destined for injurious
uses, has denied the use of postal privileges in aid of fraudulent
transactions, and has seriously contemplated at times denying
entirely all mail privileges as a penalty for certain acts on the
part of the corporation or the individual which it would have no
direct authority to punish. Congress has in this way generously
extended the scope of its authority over many subjects which
the framers of the constitution undoubtedly assumed they had
criminal schemes, impossible to be reached in any other way." Read into
the opinion of the Supreme Court from the brief for the government in
Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan (1912) 229 U. S. 288, 57 L. Ed. 1190,
33 S. C. R. 867.
6 Rogers, op cit., 33.
7 Possible expansion of postal functions is suggested by the types of
service rendered -by the post office during the war as fiscal agent for the
government through the handling of War Savings Stamps as well as other
miscellaneous activities. The war-time control of the telegraph and tele-
phone systems by the postmaster general was effected as an exercise of
the war power, and no apparent effort was made to correlate the activi-
ties of those systems with those of the post office, as is done in some
European countries. Whether Congress could, merely as an exercise of
the postal power, acquire all the telegraph lines is a question which was
referred to but left open by the Supreme Court in the case of Pensacola
Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., (1877) 96 U. S. 1, 24
L. Ed. 708.
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succeeded in leaving to the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.
In short, the national government has ma'naged to make the
seemingly matter-of-fact and innocent grant of authority to
establish post offices and post roads serve as a "constitutional
peg" upon which to hang a very substantial federal police power
which may be employed to regulate and protect the national
safety, good order, and morals. The postal power, therefore,
forms a very important adjunct to the power to regulate com-
merce,8 and to tax,9 the three powers building up both by direc-
tion and indirection what, for want of a better term, may be called
the police power of the national government. It is the purpose
of this article to trace the various lines along which this national
police power has developed under the postal clause of the con-
stitution, to examine the conflicting views regarding the constitu-
tional propriety of that development, and to determine, if possible,
what are the true limits of the police power so derived.
The problem under consideration may be conveniently treated
under four principal topics: (1) First, there are police regula-
tions which Congress has enaoted to protect the safety and
efficiency of the postal system. Here may be placed such laws
as those excluding poisons and. explosives from the mails. (2)
Second, there are those police regulations enacted to prevent the
postal system from being used for purposes which are injurious
to the public welfare or to encourage such uses of the postal
system as are beneficial to the public welfare. The fraud order
legislation and the obscene literature acts will fall into this group.
(3) Third, may be mentioned those regulatiohs which deny the
right to use the mails for the purpose of violaiting or evading
the laws of the states. The act forbidding the mailing of liquor
advertisements into prohibition states exemplifies this type of
statute. (4) Finally, there are proposals that conformity to
general police regulations be made the price of the enjoyment
of postal privileges. Here would be classed the recent proposal
to deny the privileges of the United States mails to all persons
employing child labor. Each of these types of police regulation
under the postal power may be briefly examined.
8 See Cushman, The National Police Power under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution, (1919) 3 MINNESOTA LAw RE IEW 289, 381,
452.
9 See Cushman, The National Police Power under the Taxing Clause
of the Constitution, (1920) 4 MINNESOTA LAw REvIEW 247.
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I. POLICE REGULATIONS TO PROTECT THE SAFETY AND
EFFICIENCY OF THE MAILS
The right of Congress to pass such laws as are reasonably
designed to protect the safety and efficiency of the postal system
has at no time been seriously questioned, and is at present not
questioned at all. Congress has been expressly granted the power
to establish post offices; and it would be ridiculous to allege that
the power to establish a governmental agency did not of necessity
carry with it the power- to preserve and protect it when once
established.10 Congress has, in fact, exercised such power ever
since our national postal system was created. The most obvious
and natural form of postal protection has been, of course, the
enactment of laws punishing various acts which are criminal in
themselves. Some twenty sections of the United States Criminal
Code"" are devoted to such offenses as robbing, destroying, or
obstructing the mails, injuring mail property, counterfeiting
money orders and stamps, or in any way defrauding the post
office.' 2 But a consideration of these measures would not prop-
erly be included in a discussion of the national police power'13
even if they raised, as they do not, any interesting or important
questions of constitutional construction. There are, however,
two types of legislation which Congress has passed for protecting
the mail service and promoting its efficiency which may be classi-
fied as police regulations and upon which brief comment may be
made. The first comprises the enactments designed to make the
postal service a government monopoly; the second includes the
laws excluding from the mails things which would imperil or
10 In developing his doctrine of implied powers Marshall used what
he thought must be regarded as an entirely obvious illustration, the right
of Congress to protect the post office. He said: "Take, for example the
power to establish post offices and post roads. This power is executed
by-the single act of making the establishment. But from this has been
inferred the power and duty of carrying the mail along the post road
and from one post office to another. And, from this implied power, has
again been inferred the right to punish those who steal letters from the
post office, or rob the mail. It may be said, with some plausibility, that
the right to carry the mail, and to punish those who rob it, is- not indis-
pensably necessary to the establishment of a' post office and post road.
This right is, indeed, essentiM to the beneficial exercise of the power, but
not indispensably necessary to its existence." McCulloch v. Maryland,(1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.
"I Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. at L. 1088.
12 Ibid, Secs. 189-202, 205, 218-221, 227-228.
13 The enactment of ordinary criminal statutes is usually classified as
an exercise of power outside the scope of the police power. See Freund,
Police Power, Secs. 4-8.
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injure the mails themselves, or postal property, or postal em-
ployees.
1. Regulations to Insure Postal Monopoly. The national
postal system was made a government monopoly in 179214 and
has remained -so ever since.'s Although the grant of postal power
to Congress did not by its terms create a government monopoly
and although there is judicial authority for the view that the
monol3olistic character of the postal system results not from the
postal clause but from the legislation enacted under it,16 there
would seem to be some reason to believe that the framers of
the constitution expected that the new post office would become
a monopoly in the hands of the government. There was plenty
of precedent as well as public policy17 to support such a principle.
The British post office had long been a government monopoly'
and Blackstone had emphasized the paramount necessity for such
exclusive control.' 9 Thus while many questions have from time
to time arisen as to the correct interpretation to be placed upon
the acts of Congress penalizing the private carrying of the
mails, 20 there has been no serious attack made upon the consti-
tutional right of Congress to pass those laws.21 The recent action
14 Act of Feb. 20, 1792, 1 Stat. at L. 232. In 1782 the Congress of
the Confederation had passed "An Ordinance for Regulating the Post
Office of the United States of America." By one of the provisions of this
Ordinance, Congress attempted to create and maintain a postal monopoly.
7 Journals of Congress 383. For summary of this entire act, see Rogers,
op. cit., 17 ff.
'5 United States Criminal Code, Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat at L
1088, Secs. 179, 181, 186.
16 "But the monopoly of the government is an optional, not an essential
part of its postal system. The mere existence of a postal department of
the government is not an establishment of the monopoly." United States
v. Kochersperger, (1860) Fed. Cis. No. 15,541.
17 "The post office monopoly is primarily an institution for the public
benefit which must exclude competition from its. profitable business in
order to carry on the unprofitable business," Freund, Police Power, Sec.
666. If the post, office were to be used as a means of raising revenue as
suggested in the Convention of 1787 (supra, note 3), another ground
for monopoly would exist.
Is The development of the British Post Office as a government monop-
oly is traced at length by Hemmeon, The History of the British Post
Office, Ch. IX.
19 "Penalties were enacted in order to confine the carriage of letters
to the public office only, except in some few cases: a provision which is
absolutely necessary; for nothing but an exclusive right can support an
office of this sort: many rival independent offices would only serve to
ruin one another." Cooley's Blackstone, I, 323.
20 Rogers, op. cit., 41 ff.
21 "To give efficiency to its regulations and prevent rival postal sys-
tems, it may perhaps prohibit the carriage by others for hire, over'postal
routes,- of articles which legitimately constitute mail matter . . .' Ex
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of the federal authorities to prevent under the terms of the
Criminal Code the transportation of telegraphic night letters by
train instead of by wire, indicates that the statutes under con-
sideration are adequate to cope with new and unusual forms of
competition against the United 'States mails.
22
2. Exclusion of Articles Injurious to the Postal Service. If
Congress in the exercise of its power to regulate interstate com-
merce may exclude from that commerce commodities which would
endanger or injure the agencies by which it is carried on,23 then,
a fortiori, it must follow that Congress may provide similar pro-
tection to a postal system which it not merely regulates but
establishes and conducts. While it is highly desirable that Con-
gress should require -that adequate safety devices should be in-
stalled on interstate trains and that reasonable regulations be
complied with in transporting explosives or other dangerous
materials, the fact remains that the federal government itself
does not serve as a common carrier and its responsibility for
the physical safety of interstate commerce is, perhaps, a second-
ary responsibility.24  The public which rides or which ships
goods in interstate commerce would be loath to part with the
protection guaranteed by federal laws; but their plight, were
that protection removed, would be no different from that of the
patrons of the wholly intrastate carriers which are not subject
to federal authority. With the postal service, however, the case
is very different. In respect to it Congress must assume a very
definite and primary responsibility. In fact, there are at least
four cogent reasons for the congressional exclusion of dangerous
and- injurious articles from the mails which do not apply to the
exclusion of similar commodities from the channels of interstate
commerce. In the first place, Congress has a proprietary interest
in the postal system which it does not have in interstate com-
merce. In passing the laws in question Congress is but taking
reasonable precautions for the protection of the property of the
federal government. In the second place, in conduoting its mail
parte Jackson, (1877) 96 U. S. 727, 735, 24 L. Ed. 877; United States v.
Bromley, (1851) 12 How. (U.S.) 87, 13 L. Ed. 905; United States v.
Thompson, (1846) 9 Law Rep. 451, Fed. Gas. No. 16,489.
22New York Times, June 21, 1918.
23Cushman, op. cit., 3 MINNEsOTA LAW REVIEW 303.
24 Persons sustaining loss by reason of the negligence of interstate
carriers would, of course, have a right of action against the carrier to
recover damages even in the absence of any statutory regulations insuring
the safety of interstate commerce.
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service the federal government offers itself as a carrier of other
people's property. Letters and property are confided to its
possession and control; indeed the laws, as has been seen,2 5 forbid
all persons to confide mail matter to any one but the postal
authorities. It follows, therdfore, that the government must
take every reasonable precaution to insure the safety of the
property it not only permits but virtually requires to be con-
fided to its care. If it fails to guarantee such safety there is no
one else to whom the person who suffers the loss or injury of
his property may look for reparation. In the third place, Con-
gress should recognize a clear resp6nsibility to provide adequately
for the safety of its postal employees and to see that they are not
exposed to avoidable dangers. Finally, since Congress has cre-
ated the postal system and is the author and source of all postal
privileges, the exercise of the power to deny those privileges to
dangerous or injurious articles could not be attacked, as the
congressional exclusions from interstate commerce have some-
times been attacked, on the ground that Congress is denying a
right or privilege which it did not create and which it has the
authority merely to regulate and not to destroy.26
Enough has been said to indicate that there can be no question
of the constitutional power of Congress to exclude dangerous and
injurious articles from the mails. It is not only the right of
Congress to pass such legislation but it is also its duty. This duty
has been fulfilled by the insertion into the Criminal Code of a
substantial list of articles which are declared non-mailable be-
cause of their injurious character,2 7 and by the delegation to the
postmaster general of the authority to expand that list.s Not
only has the -validity of this legislation never been questioned,
but the courts have not infrequently alluded to these laws as
examples of the legitimate exercise of the postal power delegated
to Congress. 29 Needless to say, this is a type of legislation which
25 Supra, p. 406.
28 For discussion of this distinction see infra, p. 423.
27 United States Criminal Code, Sec. 217, Act of March 4, 1909, 35
Stat. at L. 1131.
28 United States Official Postal Guide, 1918, p. 19.
29 "It [Congress] may also refuse to include in its mails such printed
matter or merchandise as may seem- objectionable to it upon the ground
of public policy, as dangerous to its employees or injurious to other mail
matter carried in the same packages. The postal regulations of this coun-
try issued in pursuance of act of Congress c6ntain a long list of prohibited
articles dangerous in their nature, or to other articles with which they
may come in contact, such, for instance, as liquids, poisons, explosives and
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other countries have also enacted in order to provide adequate
protection to their mails.30
II. CLASSIFICATIONS OF MAILING PRIVILEGES TO PREVENT
HARMFUL AND TO ENCOURAGE BENEFICIAL
USES OF POSTAL SYSTEM
It irequires no argument to prove that the vast postal system
of the United States, rendering as it does its many varieties of
service and reaching practically every home, is an instrumentality
for promoting and spreading civilization and culture. It is an
enormous agency for good. The characteristics which make
it an agency for good, however, also make it an agency for evil
unless measures are taken to prevent its misuse. To prevent
the postal service from being used as a conduit for dumping
injurious and harmful matter into millions of homes, and to keep
it from serving as a means of consummating fraudulent and
unlawful acts, Congress has passed a substantial body of legisla-
tion. These laws are manifestly designed for the protection
of the public and not of the postal service itself. They are de-
signed to protect the public from the misuse of the mails. They
are unmistakably police regulations for they aim squarely .at
the protection of the public health, morals, safety, and good
order. This legislatibn may be briefly analyzed and described
before an examination of its constitutional basis and limits is
entered upon.
1. Obscene Literature. Since the regulation of private
morals is by the division of power between the nation and the
states left to the latter, there was, of course, no reason why
Congress should concern itself with the problem of obscene
literature until it became clear that the mails or the channels
of commerce were being used as a means of circulating the ob-
noxious matter. Federal legislation relating to obscene literature
began with the Tariff of 1842, a provision of which forbade the
importation into this country of obscene literature or pictures.3 '
inflammable articles, fatty substances, or live or dead animals, and sub-
stances which exhale a bad odor. It has never been supposed that the
exclusion of these articles denied to their owners any of their constitu-
tional rights." Public Clearing House v. Coyne, (1903) 194 U. S. 497,
48 L Ed. 1092, 24 S. C. R. 789.
30 For sum.mary of articles, which, under the laws of foreign countries,
may not be sent through the mails into such countries, see U. S. Pfficial
Postal Guide, 1919, 137 ff.
31 Act of *Aug. 30, 1842, 5 Stat. at L. 562, Sec. 28. For the develop-
ment of the policy of excluding obscene literature from interstate coin-
merce see Cushman, op. cit., 3 MINNESOTA LAW Rvxmw 388.
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It was not until 1865 that Congress took steps to exclude matter
of this description from the mails ;32 and the first really effective
legislation for this purpose seems to have been the Act of March
3, 1873. 3 3  Various amendments to this law- have been passed
extending its scope and strengthening its provisions. 3 4  At the
present time there are two sections of the United States Criminal
Code dealing with this subject.3 5 By the first of these provisions
obscene and indecent writings, letters, pictures, or printed matter
of any sort are declared to be unmailable as well as all contra-
ceptive devices and information. 6 Such matter may not be con-
veyed in the mails nor delivered by any post office employee.
To deposit such matter in or to take it from the mails is made
a criminal offense. The second provision makes non-mailable
under severe penalties any mail matter on the outside cover of
which is found any obscene, scurrilous, libelous, or defamatory
inscriptions which would reflect injuriously upon the character
or conduct of another.3 7 While the postal authorities are not per-
mitted to receive or deliver mail matter known by them to be
in violation of the provisions just described, they are rigidly
forbidden to open sealed matter.3  While authority is given to
exclude non-mailable matter, there is no power to prevent the
subsequent circulation through the mails of later issues of the
32 Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. at L. 507. Amended June 8, 1872, 17
Stat. at L. 302.
33 17 Stat. at L. 599.
34 Act of July 12, 1876, 19 Stat. at L. 90; Act of Sept. 26, 1888, 25
Stat. at L. 496; Act of May 27, 1908, 35 Stat. at L. 416; Act of Mar. 4,
1911, 36 Stat. at L. 1339.
35 Secs. 211, 212, Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. at L. 1129.
36 "And the term 'indecent' within the intendment of this section shall
include matter of a character tending to incite arson, murder, or assassin-
ation." Sec. 211, U. S. Criminal Code. The prohibitions of the act have
been construed as applicable to the veiled advertisements of prostitutes.
United States v. Dunlop, (1897) 165 U. S. 486, 41 L. Ed. 799, 17 S. C. R.
375.
37 This provision is applicable to the sending of threatening or dun-
ning inscriptions on packages or cards. United States v. Smith, (1895)
69 Fed. 971; United States v. Davis, (1889) 38 Fed. 326; United States
v. Elliott, (1892) 51 Fed. 807; United States v. Simmons, (1894) 61 Fed.
640.
38 The inviolability of sealed mail matter from government invasion
is guaranteed by -the fourth amendment to the United States constitution
which provides, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated. . . ." "No law of Congress can place in the
hands of officials connected with the postal service any authority to invade,
the secrecy of letters and such sealed packages in the mail; and all regula-
tions adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in subordination to
the great principle embodied in the Fourth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion." Ex parte Jackson, (1877) 96 U. S. 727, 733, 24 L. Ed. 877.
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excluded publication or to forbid the subsequent use of the mails
to any persons who have violated these provisions."a
While some persons have appeared from time to time to ques-
tion the constitutionality of the obscene literature acts40 and
numerous petitions have been presented to Congress urging their
repeal ostensibly on constitutional grounds,41 there has never been
any substantial body of opinion to doubt the authority of Con-
gress to pass them. There has been a considerable number of
cases in which these acts have been construed and interpreted
4 2
and a number of the lower federal courts have declared them to
be constitutional,4" but their validity has never been attacked
before the Supreme Court.
44
2. Lottery Tickets and Circulars. Although Congress as
well as the state legislatures at first regarded the lottery as a legiti-
mate method of public finance,4 5 public sentiment condemning
the institution soon began to make itself felt. In 1827 Congress
passed its last act authorizing a lottery40 and its first act hostile
to lotteries.4 7 This latter statute, however, was not a serious
blow to lottery enterprises since it merely provided:
3 The annual report of the postmaster general for 1914 comments
upon the many requests which come to the post office department for
action of this sort and points out th limitations upon the power of the
department in respect thereto; p. 48.
40 Schroeder, Obscene Literature and Constitutional Law, passim. See
also Free Speech Anthology, by the same auth6r.
41On February 26, 1878, Congressman Benjamin F. Butler (Mass.)
presented to the House of Representatives a petition signed by 50,000 per-
sons protesting against the Obscene Literature Acts and asking their
amendment in such a manner "that they cannot be used to abridge the
freedom of the press or of conscience, or to destroy the liberty and
equality of the -people before the law and departments of the government
on acount of any religious, moral, political, medical or commercial
grounds or pretexts whatsoever." Congressional Rec. Vol. VII, p. 1340.
Sixty-three petitions similar in character were presented during the first
42 See Thomas, Non-mailable Matter, Ch. V; Rogers, op. cit., 48 ff.
43 United States v. Wilson, (1893) 58 Fed. 768; United States v. War-
ner, (1894) 59 Fed. 355.
43 Rogers, op. cit., 48 ff.
44 "For more than thirty years not only has the transmission of
obscene matter been prohibited, but it has been made a crime, punishable
by fine or imprisonment, for a person to deposit such matter in the mails.
The constitutionality of this law, we believe, has never been attacked."
Public Clearing House v. Coyne, (1903) 194 U. S. 497, 48 L. Ed. 1092,
24 S. C. R. 789. In an earlier opinion the Supreme Court referred to
the Obscene Literature Act of 1873 with apparent. approval and said,
"All that Congress meant by" this act was, that the mail should not be
used to transport such corrupting publications and articles .. " Ex
parte Jackson, (1877) 96 U. S. 727, 736, 24 L. Ed. 877.
45 For summary of this early legislation see Thomas, op. cit., Secs. 1-4.
46 Act of Feb. 22, 1827, 4 Stat. at L. 105. This act authorized the city
of Washington to include the lands of Thomas Jeffersoft within its lottery
schemes.
47 Act of March 2, 1827, 4 Stat. at L. 238.
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"That no postmaster or assistant postmaster shall act as
agent for lottery offices or under any color of purchase, or other-
wise, send lottery tickets; nor shall any postmaster receive free
of postage or frank lottery schemes, circulars, or tickets."
This mild law, however, very definitely suggests the constitu-
tional principle upon which our present vigorous anti-lottery
statutes rest: namely, that Congress may refuse to lend its postal
facilities or agents in furtherance of lottery enterprises. The
next congressional attack on lotteries did not occur until 1868.
when an act was passed providing:
"That it shall not be lawful to deposit in a post office, to be
sent by mail, any letters or circulars concerning lotteries, so-called
gift concerts or similar enterprises, offering prizes of any kind
on any pretext whatever. 48
This act, however, provided no adequate means of enforce-
ment and proved ineffective.-' In 1872 an act was passed
which made it unlawful to deposit in the mail or to send by
mail any letters or circulars concerning illegal lotteries, so-
called gift concerts, or other similar enterprises, and the
postmaster general was authorized to issue a fraud order
against any person who conducted a fraudilent lottery, gift
concert, etc.50  Four years later this act was amended by
striking out the word "illegal" before lotteries and making the
exclusion applicable to all lotteries whether forbidden by state
law or not.5 The word "fraudulent" was retained, however, in
the section relating to fraud orders.5" In 1890 the law was
amended so as to include lottery advertisements in newspapers
within its prohibition and to eliminate the word "fraudulent"
from the clause just mentioned.5 3  Under this legislation the
postmaster general was authorized to prevent by the issuance of
a fraud order the delivery of registered letters or the payment
-of money orders to persons known to be conducting lotteries or
fraudulent schemes. By Act of 1895 the department was given
power in such cases to withhold ordinary sealed mail matter as
well as registered letters.54 The anti-lottery legislation has never
48 Act of July 27, 1868, 15 Stat. at L. 194.49 There was no penalty provided for its violation and no appropri-
ation to cover the cost of administration.50 Act of June 8, 1872, 17 Stat. at L. 283.
51 Act of July 12, 1876, 19 Stat. at L. 90.
52This was construed to mean that a fraud order could be issued
against only such lotteries as were actually fraudulent in character. Opin-
ion of Attorney-General McVeagh, (1881) 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 77.
53 Act of Sept. 19, 1890, 26 Stat. at L. 465.
54Act of March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. of L. 964.
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attempted to prohibit the operators of these enterprises from
sending innocent matter through the mails.
While the constitutionality of this legislation has been bitterly
attacked on various grounds,"' it has been sustained by numerous
federal courts 6 and by the United States Supreme Court in two
important cases57 the principles of which will be discussed at a
later point in this article.58
3. Fraudulent Matter. The first attempt made by Congress
to prevent the use of the mails for the circulation of correspond-
ence relating to fraudulent schemes and enterprises was in 1872.59
This act subjected to severe penalty any person who devised any
scheme or artifice to defraud to be carried on by means of corre-
spondence through the mails and who so used the mails in
furtherance of such project. It authorized the postmaster gen-
eral to withhold registered letters and payment on money orders
from those who he had reason to believe were using the mails
for the forbidden purposes mentioned. This law was expanded
and strengthened by amendment in 18890 by elaborating the list
of schemes brought within the prohibition 61 and by forbidding
persons engaged in the proscribed enterprises to use the mails
55 For a very able presentation of the case against this legislation see
the argument of Mr. James C. Carter for the defendants in the case of In
re Rapier, (1892) 143 U. S. 110, 113, 36 L. Ed. 90, 12 S. C. R. 353. See
also brief for defendants in Ex parte Jackson, (1877) 96 U. S. 727, 24 L.
Ed. 877. Also article by Mr. Hannis Taylor entitled, "A Blow at the
Freedom of the Press," (1892) 155 North American Review 694. Mr.
Taylor's attack is based largely on the fact that in the Lottery Act of 1890
the test of the immoral or injurious character of the matter excluded was
not left to a jury but was determined' by tests which Congress established
in the act itself.
56 In re Jackson (1877) 14 Blatch. (U. S. C. C.) 245, Fed. Cas. No.
7,124; New Orleans National Bank v. Merchant, (1884) 18 Fed. 841.
57 Ex parte Jackson, (1877) 96 U. S. 727, 24 L. Ed. 877; In re Rapier,
(1892) 143 U. S. 110, 36 L. Ed. 90, 12 S. C. R. 353.
58 Infra, p. 419 ff.
59 Act of June 8, 1872, 17 Stat. at L. 283.
60 Act of March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. at L. 873.
61 The prohibitions of the act were extended to apply to those who
used the mails "to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, or
distribute, supply, or furnish, or procure for unlawful use, any counter-
feit or spurious coin, bank notes, paper money, or any obligation or
security of the United States or of any State, Territory, municipality, com-
pany, corporation, or person, or anything represented to be or intimated
or -held out to be such counterfeit or spurious articles, or any scheme or
artifice to obtain money by or through correspondence by what is com-
monly called the 'sawdust swindle,' or 'counterfeit money fraud' or by
dealing or pretending to deal in what is commonly called 'green articles;
'green coin,' 'bills,' 'paper goods,' spurious Treasury notes; 'United States
goods,' 'green cigars,' or any other names or terms intended to be under-
stood as relating to such counterfeit or spurious articles."
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under an assumed name. 62 In 1895 the scope of the fraud orders
issued was extended to include all first class mail.6 3 While post
office officials have from time to time recommended the further
amendment of the anti-fraud statutes to embrace within their
provisions enterprises not now included, 64 the present legislation
has proved adequate to put an end to thousands of cheating and
swindling -schemes which had used the mails as the indispensable
means of getting into touch with their victims.65
As in the case of the acts already examined, there has been
a large amount of litigation over the construction of the anti-
fraud acts and their applicability to specific schemes or enter-
prises.66 There have been attacks upon the constitutionality of
the statutes on the ground of the procedure provided for the
issuance of fraud orders and the courts have laid down certain
rules respecting the scope and finality of the postmaster general's
discretion in the matter.67 Both lower federal courts68 and the
62 1y a section of this act, the postmaster general is authorized to
require the personal identification of persons receiving mail matter when
he has reason to believe that the names or addresses on such matter are
fictitious.63 Act of March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. at L. 964.
64The annual reports of the postmaster general in recent years have
repeatedly urged the inclusion within the prohibitions of the law of all
gambling devices or paraphernalia of any sort. For the text of this pro-
posed legislation see Report of the Postmaster General for 1914, p. 81.6-5 Data regarding the operation of the law is summarized yearly in
greater or less detail in the report of the postmaster general. See report
for 1918, p. 58.
66 These questions are discussed in detail in Thomas, op. cit., Ch. IV.
See also Rogers, op. cit, 56. It may be noted that schemes which may beincluded within the prohibitions of the act as "fraudulent" are not merely
those which would be held fraudulent at common law as involving actual
misrepresentation as to a past or existing fact, but extend to "everything
designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present or sug-
gestions and promises as to the future. . . . It was with the purpose of
protecting the public against all such intentional efforts to despoil and
prevent the post office from being used to carry them into effect that this
statute was passed; and it would strip it of its value to confine it to such
cases as disclosed an. actual misrepresentation as to some existing fact, and
exclude those in which is ortly the allurement of a specious and- glittering
promise." Durland v. United States, (1896) 161 U. S. 306, 314, 40 L. Ed.
712, 16 S. C. R. 508.
67 It has been held by the Supreme Court that the judgment of the post-
master general with reference to the issuance of fraud orders must be
based on facts supported by evidence as to the fraudulent nature of the
enterprise concerned and may not be based merely upon his personal belief
that the scheme is fraudulent. A fraud order was held unlawfully issued
against a concern which claimed to cure disease by the influence of the
mind because "there is no exact standard of absolute truth by which to
prove the assertion false and a fraud. . . . We may not believe in the
efficacy of the treatment to the extent claimed by the complainants, and
we may have no sympathy with them in such claims, and yet their effec-
tiveness is but a matter of opinion in any court." American School of
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United States Supreme Court69 have held that Congress enjoys
.power under the constitution to pass the legislation in question,
which does not after all differ in principle from the acts relating
to obscene literature and lotteries.
4. Prize Fight Films. By a statute passed in 1912 it is made
a criminal offense to import from abroad for purposes of public
exhibition pictures or moving picture films of prize fights or to
send them in or to receive them from interstate commerce or the
mails.7 0 The only litigation to date respecting the validity of this
act concerns the provision against importation.71 There can be
no doubt whatever that that portion of the act which authorizes
the exclusion from the mails would be sustained by the Supreme
Court should its constitutionality be questioned.
5. Seditious and Treasonable Publications. It will be re-
called that one of the reasons which led England and other coun-
tries to make their post offices government monopolies was the
desire to use the mail facilities for an official espionage on private
correspondence with a view to discovering who were the enemies
of the sovereign or his ministers.7 2 It is quite natural that this
Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, (1902) 187 U. S. 94, 47 L. Ed. 90, 23 S.
C. R. 33.
The problem of the finality of the action of the postmaster general in
issuing fraud orders is touched upon in a general article by Professor
T. R. Powell entitled, Conclusiveness of Administrative Determinations in
the Federal Government, Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev., Aug. 1907, p. 583.
For criticism of -the broad powers conferred upon the postmaster gen-
eral by this legislation see Pierce, Federal Usurpation, p. 354.
6 New Orleans Nat'l Bank v. Merchapt, (1884) 18 Fed. 841; Hoover
v. McChesney, (1897) 81 Fed. 472; United States v. Loring, (1884) 91
Fed. 881.
69 Public Clearing House v. Coyne, (1903) 194 U. S. 497, 24 S. C. R.
789.
70 Act of July 31, 1912, 37 Stat. at L. 240.
71Weber v. Freed, (1915) 239 U. S. 325, 60 L. Ed. 308, 36 S. C. R. 131.
See Cushman, op. cit., 3 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw 392.
72 Hemmeon points out that the proclamation of 1591 making the
British foreign post a monopoly was issued "in order that the government
might be able to discover any treasonable or seditious correspondence,"
History of British Post Office, 190. Freund states: "In a royal grant of
the office of postmaster to foreign parts (July 19, 1632, XIX Rymer's
Foedera 385) the monopoly is justified by the consideration, how much
it imports to the state of the King and this realm that the secrecy thereof
be not disclosed to foreign nations, which cannot be prevented if a
promiscuous use of transmitting or taking up of foreign letters and
packets should be suffered.' Cromwell spoke of the Post Office as the
best means to discover and prevent dangerous and wicked designs against
the commonwealth," Police Power, Sec. 666, note. See also May, Consti-
tutional History of England, II, 245 ff.
"The post office is no longer regarded in England as a means of detect-
ing conspiracies. Letters passing through the mails may nevertheless be
opened on the warrant of the secretary of state, but the occurence is
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early purpose should not be entirely forgotten even in those
countries in which the secrecy of themail is now preserved, and
that in critical times efforts should be taken to prevent the use
of mail facilities for treasonable or seditious purposes. 73 No
government can be expected to lend positive aid to those who
are seeking to accomplish its destruction. It would, of course,
be unnecessary to forbid specifically the use of the mails for the
actual executioff of a treasonable plot or conspiracy. 74  In time
of war, however, the United States government has taken steps
to prevent the circulation through the mails of matter which
would tend even indirectly to interfere with the success of the
military preparations or campaigns of the government. During
the Civil War the exclusion of objectionable matter from mails
was carried on by the executive arm of the government 75 with-
out the authority of any statute but with the acquiescence of
Congress. 76 While there was protest from those subjected to this
treatment,77 there seems to have been no litigation arising from
these executive acts, which were apparently regarded as part of
the military policy of the government.78 When the Obscene
Literature Act of 1872 was passed Congress included in its de-
scription of proscribed matter "any letter upon the envelope of
which, or postal card upon which scurrilous epithets may have
very rare, and would be sanctioned by public opinion only in extreme
cases." Cooley's Blackstone, Book I, 323, note.
73 See provisions of the recent Trading with the Enemy Act establish-
ing a censorship of foreign mail and forbidden communications to foreign
countries during the period of the war except through the mails. Act of
Oct. 6, 1917, 40 Stat. at L. 412.
74 "The overt act of putting a letter into the post office of the United
States is a matter that Congress may regulate. . . . Intent may make
an otherwise innocent act criminal, if it is the step in a plot." Badders v.
United States, (1916) 240 U. S. 391, 36 S. C. R. 367.
S75 These exclusions d'o not seem to have been carried out by the post
office department exclusively. This power was exercised by the secretary
of state on some occasions. This officer withdrew "mail privileges from the
New York Staats Zeitung and from the National Zeitung (New York) in
1861.. Official Records of War of Rebellion, 2nd Series, Vol. 2, 494, 501.
For instances of such exclusion of newspapers from the mails by mili-
tary authority see Sen. Doc. No. 19, 37 Cong., 3d Sess. The writer is
indebted to Professor James G. Randall for this data.
76 An investigation into the alleged arbitrary acts of the postmaster
general was conducted in 1862 and 1863 by the Judiciary Committee of the
House of Representatives. The power claimed by the postmaster general
was sustained *by the committee and no action was taken. Burgess, The
Civil War and-the Constitution, II, 222-3.
77 An editorial in the New York World for August 18, 1864, denounced
the espionage upon private correspondence by postal authorities.
78 See the valuable article by Professor James G. Randall, "The News-
paper Problem in Its Bearing upon Military Secrecy During the Civil
War, (19L8) 23 Am. Hist. Rev., 303.
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been written or printed or disloyal devices printed or engraved
thereon." 9 When this act was amended and broadened in scope
the next year, however, the phrase relating to "disloyal devices"
was omitted.80 The first effective legislation which Congress
enacted dealing with this problem is found in the Espionage Act
of 1917.81 In addition to its general prohibitions the law pro-
vides that any mail matter which is. in violation of any provisions
of the statute is non-mailable, that any matter "urging treason,
insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the United
States, is hereby declared non-mailable." A heavy penalty is
inflicted upon those who use or attempt to use the mails for the
transmission of any matter thus declared non-mailable.
8 2 In 1918
this act was amended so as to extend to the postmaster general
during the period of the war authority to order all mail matter
to be withheld from persons who, "upon evidence satisfactory
to him," he concludes are using the mails in violation of any of
the provisions mentioned above.
8 3
This legislation has been much discussed both from the stand-
point of public policy and from that of constitutional law. It
seems clear, however, that most of the attacks which have been
made upon it have been directed in reality not sb much at the
validity of the statute itself as at the administration of it and its
proper applicability to concrete cases. On the point of constitu-
tional power to pass the acts in question there can be no serious
disagreement. The Obscene Literature Acts and the Anti-Fraud
Acts afford clear precedents; and the lower federal courts which
have passed upon the constitutionality of these clauses of the
Espionage Act have uniformly upheld them.
8 4
6. Denial of Postal Facilities Used for Violating Federal
Law. In at least two of the statutes which have been mentioned,
Congress has legislated upon the theory that it was proper to
refuse to allow the postal facilities to be used as an agency in
the violation of federal law. The Anti-Fraud Act at the present
time includes within its prohibitions the use of the mails to dis-
I- Act of June 8, 1872, 17 Stat. at L. 302.
80 Act of March. 3, 1873, 17 Stat. at L. 599.81 Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat at L,'230.
82 The provision in the Trading with. the Enemy Act for the licensing
by the postmaster general under direction of the president of foreign
language newspapers is not primarily a postal regulation, since the right
was denied to'unlicensed papers not merely to mail but to publish or cir-
culate in-any other way. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, 40 Stat. at L. 425.
83 Act of May 16, 1918, 40 Stat. at L. 553.
84 Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, (1917) 244 Fed. 535; same, (1917)
245 Fed. 102; Jeffersonion Publishing Co. v. West, (1917) 245 Fed. 585.
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pose of, circulate, or procure counterfeit money or securities of
the United States. 5  Congress possesses, of course, adequate
power to punish the counterfeiting of its own currency and securi-
ties and those of foreign countries and has long since exercised
this power."' By the provision dealing with the transmission of
counterfeit money or securities through the mails, Congress has
merely refused to permit the United States Post Office to act as
an unwitting accomplice of those committing or intending to
commit a crime against the laws of the United States. In the
same way it will be recalled Congress made it unlawful to trans-
mit through the mails any matter which was in violation of any
provision of the Espionage Act.8 7  Upon the same theory rests
the statutory provision declaring non-mailable any publication
which violates any copyright granted by the United States.8
It would, of course, be possible to expand very greatly the
amount of this type of legislation and there have been proposals
from time to time to that effect-8  It would be entirely possible
to penalize the use of the mails as an aid in the violation of the
prohibition amendment, the Sherman Act, or for the purpose of
soliciting unlawful campaign contributions in congressional elec-
tions. It is difficult to imagine any offense against the United
States government in the furtherance of which the criminal might
not make use of the facilities of the postal service. The power
of Congress to punish the use of the mails for these unlawful
purposes seems to be quite unassailable. As a matter of practical
expediency, however, this sort of legislation is not apt to be
resorted to unless the systematic use of the postal facilities is
so vital to the accomplishment of the crime that under normal
circumstances the post office affords a more or less effective
means for its detection or prevention."
85 Supra, note 61.86These prohibitions are to be found in Chapter VII of the United
States Criminal Code, Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. at L. 1115.87 Supra, p. 417. It is also made a criminal 'offense to send through the
mails any threats against the life of the president of the Tjnited States.The same provision penalizes the making of such threats orally or in any
other way. Act of Feb. 14, 1912, 39 Stat. at L. 919.
88 Act of March 3, 1879, 20 Stat at L. 359. Section 320 of the Crimi-
nal Code makes it a penal offense to import from abroad through the
mails any publication which violates- copyright laws or infringes rights
accruing thereunder. Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. at L. 1083.
89 It has been proposed, for example, to penalize the use of the mails
for the purpose of securing false witnesses, suborning perjury and like
offenses. A bill to this effect was introduced in the Senate in .1917. SeeSen. bill 2523, Cong. Rec., June 27, 1917, Vol. 55, p. 4337.90 No useful purpose would be served by making it a crime to mail a
letter in furtherance of such an offense against the criminal laws of the
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THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
The foregoing analysis has sketched briefly the principal types
of statutes by which Congress has sought to prevent the federal
postal system from being used as a means of distributing in-
jurious matter or of aiding the consummation of injurious and
illicit transactions. In every case in which the'constitutionality
of any of these acts has been passed upon by a court it has been
sustained; and there can be no doubt but that those acts which
have not been subjected to judicial scrutiny rest upon the same
or equally firm constitutional grounds. The very unanimity with
which the" courts have declared that Congress has not gone too
far in enacting these laws has, of course, precluded the rhaking
of any authoritative judicial pronouncement as to just how far
Congress may still go in the exercise of this power. The ques-
tion whether Congress has exhausted its authority in this particu-
lar legislative field remains open fqr speculation. It is a question
which may conveniently be dealt with under two headings:
first, the constitutional basis for the power now under consider-
ation; this will involve a review of the various theories advanced
in support of that power; and second, the constitutional limita-
tions within which the power must be exercised. Consideration
of these two problems may aid in reaching a conclusion as to
whether Congress may go still further in prohibiting the use of
the mails as an agency for evil or undesirable ends, or in en-
couraging such use for purposes beneficial to the public welfare.
1. Constitutional Basis of Legislation. Opinions regarding
the power of .Congress to exclude different classes of things from
the mails range all the way from the view that Congress has
no power to exclude anything which was mailable at the time the
federal constitution was formed91 to the equally extreme view
that Congress may exclude froil the mails anything it pleases.92
But the theories on which the right of exclusion has most com-
monly been sustained are two in number.
United States as peonage, or piracy, or other crimes where the use of
postal facilities would form a rare or very minor means of criminal
accomplishment.
91 "So long as the duty of carrying the mails is imposed upon Congress,
a letter or a packet'which was confessedly mailable matter at the time of
the adoption of the constitution, cannot be excluded by them, provided the
postage be paid and other regulations be observed." Brief for defendants
in Ex parte Jackson, (1877) 96 U. S., 727, 24 L. Ed. 877. The view was
expressed, however, that matter which had become mailable since that
time could be excluded.
92 See infra, p. 421.
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(a) In the first place, there has been a general recognition
of the fact that a very special duty and responsibility rests upon
Congress to protect the public from certain types of evils or
injuries to which the very existence of an efficient postal system
would otherwise expose them. As has been pointed out elsewhere,
Congress has lbng since recognized and assumed a similar re-
sponsibility in respect to foreign and interstate commerce.93 If
Congress possesses such police power by reason of its authority
over a commerce which it does not create but merely regulates, it
cannot be doubted that equal or even greater authority would
be derived from the power to "create" or "establish" a postal
systefn. It may be urged, in fact, tlat while the constitutional
authority arising from the commerce and postal clauses is ample
in both cases to support this type of legislation, a much stronger
moral obligation rests upon Congress to protect the public health,
morals, safety, and general welfare from the misuse of the mails
than from the misuse of the facilities of interstate commerce.
Two considerations support this view. The first is that the
responsibilities arising from the fact of creation, ownership,
and operation of an institution may be reasonably regarded
as greater than those arising from a power merely to "regulate"
a system or institution which Congress did not create, does not
own nor operate, and cannot destroy. The second is that the
ordinary individual is in a much better position to protect him-
self from the misuse of interstate commerce than from the misuse
of the mails. This is due to the essential differences between the
two systems. Under normal circumstances the participation of
the individual in the transactions of interstate commerce and
his relations to interstate carriers result from a voluntary con-
tractuail relationship. Spurious or even harmful products may
be sent to him, but rarely without his having bargained for the
shipment of any products at all. A very different situation exists
with respect to the postal system. At practically negligible cost
to the sender, grossly indecent letters or papers could be brought
several times a day to the door of any person by an employee of
the United States government and this without the previous
knowledge and against the wishes of the *recipient. Without
depriving himself of all the conveniences arising from the regu-
lar visits of the postman a person might be quite unable to pro-
tect himself against this sort of abuse. It is not unreasonable to
03 Cushman, op. cit., 3 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 391 ff.
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assert that the governmental authority which thus penetrates
daily the very homes of the people must recognize a commensu-
rate duty of protecting those homes from the distribution of
noxious matter. Even those who have been solicitous that the
national government should not attempt to extend its authority
over subjects commonly left to state control have looked upon
the sort of national police regulations now under consideration
as not only harmless but highly desirable. 4  Assuming for the
sake of argument that every citizen enjoys a well-protected con-
stitutional right to the unrestricted and equal use of the mails,
it would be useless to argue that the regulations in question un-
constitutionally abridge that right, since no one can be said to have
a right to circulate matter which is injurious to the public health,
morals, or safety."5 Most of the court decisions in which the
validity of this type of legislation has been considered have laid
strong emphasis upon the right and duty of Corigress to protect
the public welfare from the abuse of mail privileges.98
(b) There are those, however, who go beyond this admittedly
conservative view of the power of Congress to exclude various
types of matter from the mails which has just been discussed.
They take the position that Congress may not only make it unlaw-
ful to send through the mails such things as are dangerous to
health, morals, or safety, either intrinsically or in the use to which
they are to be put, but may also deny mail privileges to things
or to transactions which do not conform to congressional views
of public policy. In other words, the power of exclusion is held
to extend not only to things which are actually or potentially
injurious or dangerous but to those the circulation of which in
the judgment of Congress would be undesirable or unwise.
9 7
9 See discussion of Mr. 'Bryan's views on this point, infra p. 436.95 Lottery Case, (1903) 188 U. S. 321, 23 S. C. R. 321, 47 L. Ed. 492;
Hoke v. United States, (1913) 227 U. S. 308, 33 S. C. R. 281, 57 L. Ed.,
523.
96United States v. Journal Co., (1912) 197 Fed. 415; Knowles v.
United States, (1909) 170 Fed. 409; In Jeffersonion Publishing Co. v.
West, (1917)245 Fed. 585, the court said in respect to the exclusion of mail
matter in violation of the Espionage Act, "Had the postmaster general
longer permitted the use of the postal system which he controls for the
dissemination of such poison, it would have been to forego the opportunity
to serve his country afforded by his lofty station."
97 An extreme statement of this view is found in the argument for the
government in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, (1913) 229 U. S. 288, 57
L. Ed. 1190; 33 S. C. R. 867.
It was stated in substance that the postal power is. one which "conveys
an absolute right of legislative selection as to what shall be carried in the
mails, and which therefore is not in any wise subject to judicial control,
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The considerations advanced in support of this position may be
briefly reviewed.
At the outset it must be admitted that Congress in establishing
a postal system must of necessity determine what is to be regarded
as mail matter and what is not, Obviously not everything need
be transmitted through the mails unless the post office is to per-
form all the functions of a common carrier. This necessity of
determining what shall constitute mail matter carries with it the
power and duty of setting up classifications as to various types
of matter. No positive obligation rests upon the government to
carry any particular class of articles. Should Congress decide
that nothing but sealed letters of a certain size and weight may
be sent through the mails, there could be no doubt of its con-
stitutional authority so to legislate. The Supreme Court has
recognized that Congress in establishing a postal system may
properly set up classifications of matter in respect to mailing
privileges.
"In establishing such a system, Congress may restrict its use
to letters and deny it to periodicals; it may include periodicals and
exclude books; it may admit books to the mails and refuse to
admit merchandise; or it may include all of these and fail to
embrace within its regulations telegrams or large parcels of
merchandise, although in most civilized countries of Europe these
are also made a part of the postal service."9' 8
This power of classification arises from the fact that Congress
creates, owns, and operates the postal system and that in exer-
cising this power of classification Congress may properly give
effect to its own conceptions of public policy. Its position is that
of a proprietor; and it is under no obligation to lend the use of
its property for purposes which it regards as unwise and unde-
sirable, nor is it prohibited from extending the use of its mail
facilities on especially favorable terms to those who will make use
of them for the promotion of constructive ideas of public policy.
In short, Congress may not only discourage certain uses of the
mails which it deems contrary to public policy but it may also
stimulate and encourage other uses of the mails which it regards
as helpful or beneficial to the national welfare. From the prac-
tical point of view, the latter method would of the two seem to
even although in a given case it may be manifest that a particular exclu-
sion is but arbitrary, because resting on no discernable distinction, nor
coming within any discoverable principle of justice or public policy."9sPublic Clearing House v. Coyne, (1903) 194 U. S. 497, 48 L. Ed.
1092, 24 S. C. R. 789.
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be easier of execution as well as less open to criticism; and
Congress has employed it in numerous instances. The most
conspicuous examples are the special privileges extended to peri-
odical literature under the statutes creating second class mailing
privileges,-9 the extension of the franking privilege to the
speeches of members of Congress printed in the Congressional
Record,""0 and the act providing for the free transmission
through the mails of reading matter printed in raised characters
for the use of the blind.
1
'
1
If it is true that the relationship of the government to. the
post office partakes largely of proprietorship, it would follow that
the use of the mail service by the individual is a privilege rather
than a constitutional right.'0 ' This seems to be recognized by the
decisions of the courts either directly or by implication.
10 3  It
constitutes an important difference between the rights of the
individual to engage in interstate commerce and to use the mails.
There is without question a constitutionally protected right of
the citizen to engage in interstate commerce, subject, of course,
to such rules and provisions as Congress may impose by virtue
of its power to regulate that commerce. 10 4 Congress may control
the exercise of that right; but it may not destroy it entirely. 0 5
The postal facilities, however, come into being only at the dis-
cretion of Congress; and neither the refusal of Congress to create
them or expand them nor its complete withdrawal of them would
violate an affirmative right guaranteed by the constitution. 0 6
It was this distinction between the relation of the individual to
the postal service and to interstate commerce which the Supreme
99Act of March 3, 1879, 20 Stat. 359 and silbsequent amendments.
100 A~t of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. at L. 343.
101 Act of April 27, 1904, 33 Stat. at L. 313 permits the free transmis-
sion of literature in raised characters to and from public institutions or
libraries, Act of Aug. 24, 1912, 37 Stat. at L. 551 extended the privilege to
all periodicals in raised characters irrespective of destination.
102 For valuable theoretical discussion of distinction between "rights"
and "privileges," see Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, (1913) 23 Yale Law Journal 16.
103People's U. S. Bank v. Gilson, (1905) 140 Fed. 1, 5; Missouri
Drug Co. v. Wyman, (1904) 129 Fed. 623.
104 United States v. Del. & Hudson Co., (1908) 164 Fed. 215, reversed
on other grounds in 213 U. S. 366.
105 There is no decision of the Supreme Court squarely on this point
since Congress has never tried to exercise such power of destruction. The
reasoning of the Supreme Court in United States v. Del. & Hudson Co.,
supra, certainly lends support to this view.
106 "A citizen of the United States as such has a right to participate in
foreign and interstate connerce, to have the benefit of the postal laws
. .. Cooley, Principles of Constitutional Law, 273. Italics are the
writer's.
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Court apparently had in mind in the Jackson case, when, after
upholding the authority of Congress to exclude lottery circulars
from the mails, it declared :107
"But we do not think that Congress possesses the power to
prevent the transportation in other ways, as merchandise, of
matter which it excludes from the mails."
This important distinction between a privilege and a right
is one which is clearly recognized in our constitutional law; and
there is plenty of precedent and authority for the view that in
dispensing privileges which it has a right to withhold entirely
the government may classify the recipients in order to give effect
to its views respecting public policy, even though such classifi-
cations would be open to constitutional attack if applied to those
enjoying a constitutional right. In the disposal of public lands
Congress may properly pursue a constructive policy of encourag-
ing homestead development. 08  Aliens seeking admission to the
United States or seeking the privileges of American citizenship
may be classified by Congress in ways which would seem arbitrary
if the persons subjected to such discriminations had any constitu-
tional right to demand of this government the thing they were
seeking.10 9 It is well established that since nQ one has a right to
perform work for the United States government Congress may
provide that those who do enjoy that privilege may be subjected
to the requirement of the eight-hour day for employees,110 al-
though the right of a state to establish a general eight-hour day
for all labor as an exercise of the police power must still be
regarded as open to -the most serious question.-" The establish-
ment of similar classifications by the various states in respect to
public work has been sustained."1 2 The United States Supreme
Court has held, in fact, that while a state may not under its
107 (1877) 96 U. S. 727, 735, 24 L. Ed. 877.
108 See the Homestead Act of May 20, 1862, and subsequent legislation
of similar nature.
109 See pamphlet, "Naturalization Laws and Regulations" revised to
October 10, 1919, published by United States Dept. of Labor. It is not
intended to suggest, however, that aliens applying for citizenship may not
be classified along lines much more arbitrary than would be permissible
if they were citizens applying for some other privilege.
110 Act of Aug. 1, 1892, 27 Stat. at L. 340, upheld in Ellis v. United
States, (1906) 206 U. S. 246, 51 L. Ed. 1047, 27 S. C. R. 600.
M This -would seem to be suggested by the fact tnat regulations of
the hours of labor are still upheld, if at all, mainly upon grounds of pro-
tection to health. See Bunting v. Oregon, (1917) 243 U. S. 426, 37 S.
C. R. 435, 61 L. Ed. 830 upholding the Oregon Ten Hour Law. It is-
doubtful if an eight hour law could be sustained on this basis.
11 2Atkin v. Kansas, (1903) 191 U. S. 207, 24 S. C. R. 124, 48 L. Ed.
148.
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police power prevent the employment of aliens by private em-
ployers of labor,"13 it may discriminate against aliens when it
comes to work done for the state itself." 4 The right to contract
freely with other persons for the performance of labor is a right
which cannot be denied by the state; but the right to be employed
on the public work of the state itself is not a right at all, but a
privilege.
Enough has been said to make clear that the power of Con-
gress over the postal system is broader and more complete than
over an institution or a system in respect to which its relation is
not that of creator, owner, and operator. It is equally obvious
that the so-called right of the individual to use the mails is not
a right guaranteed to him by the constitution, such as the right
to engage in interstate commerce or the right to be tried for
crime only by a jury of his peers; it is a privilege the length
and breadth of which is determined by a congressional discretion
broad enough to allow general considerations of public policy
to dictate the terms upon which it may be enjoyed.
It would, however, be entirely erroneous to assume that be-
cause Congress may for reasons of public policy set up classi-
fications as to the purposes for which it is willing to allow the
postal service to be used, it may make any and all classifications
it chooses, no matter how arbitrary. The fact that Congress is
under no constitutional compulsion to create a postal system at
all does not mean that it may refuse to transmit in the system
it has created the literature of one religious, sect, or a particular
political party. If it allowed the mailing of letters at all, it
could not exclude love-letters and admit letters relating to the
business of coal-mining. This is, of course, merely to say that
although in the exercise of its power over the postal system Con-
gress may give effect to its *views of public policy, it must at all
times keep its legislation within certain constitutional limits. The
character and operation of those constitutional limits may now
be examined.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS UPON LEGISLATIONl"
5
In classifying the uses and purposes to which it is willing to
extend the privileges of the mails, Congress is subject to two im-
113 Truax v. Raich, (1915) 239 U. S. 33, 36, S. C. R. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131.
114 Heim v. McCall, (1915) 239 U. S. 175, 60 L. Ed. 200, 36 S. C. R.
78.
"'5The constitutional prohibition in the fourth amendment against
unreasonable searches and seizures (supra, p. 410) is of course a limitation
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portant constitutional limitations. One of these is the prohibition
against the passing of any law abridging the freedom of religion
or the press ; 16 the other is the more general prohibition against
deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. "7
1. Freedom of Religion and the Press. It must be borne in
mind that Congress is forbidden by the first amendment to the
constitution not merely to interfere by direct and positive action
with freedom of religion and of the press, but it is forbidden also
to use its granted powers in such a way as to abridge those
fundamental rights." 8 It does not matter, therefore, how abso-
lute or unliniited the power of Congress over the postal service
might be, that power cannot be exercised to abridge religious
freedom or to limit the freedom of the press. It does not, how-
ever, follow that no restraint may be placed upon the circulation
of matter through the mails because of a possible abridgment of
these rights. Neither freedom of religion nor freedom of the
press is an absolute and unqualified right which may be set up
against every conceivable governmental encroachment. They are
both alike subject to reasonable restrictions in the interests of
the public safety and morals and general welfare. 1 9 Religion
may not act as a cloak to protect polygamy from being attacked
as subversive of -public morals; and the exclusion from the mails
of matter designed to promote the spread of polygamy on
grounds of religion could no more be attacked as an abridgment
of religious freedom than could a direct law which suppressed
polygamy entirely as immoral be attacked as such an abridg-
ment. 20  So also the same power Which justifies the penalizing
of treasonable or seditious utterances or publications would nat-
urally extend to the denial of mail facilities to matter of this char-
acter, nor could there be alleged any interference with the
freedom of the press .'2 '
upon every exercise of the postal power. This point need not be further
discussed as it has no peculiar bearing upon the topic under consideration.
316 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press. . . ." U. S. Const. Amendment I.
;17 "Nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law." U. S. Const. Amend. V.
"1 Monogahela Navigation Co. v. United States, (1893) 148 U. S.
312, 336, 13 S. C. R. 622, 37 L. Ed. 463.
" 9 Freund, Police Power, Secs. 467, 468; Willoughby, Constitution, II,
841; Hall, Constitutional Law, 90.
120 Reynolds v. United States, (1878) 98 U. S. 145, 163, 25 L. Ed. 244.
-12 In Sch~nck v. United States, (1919) 249 U. S. 47, 39 S. C. R. 247,
the Espionage Act was upheld by the Supreme Cotirt as against the criti-
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If, however, Congress should attempt to exclude from the
mails the literature devoted to the propagation of Christian
Science or Catholicism, or if it should enact that sectarian jour-
nals should be transmitted free or at lower rates than other
religious periodicals, there is no doubt but that such legislation
would be held to violate the freedom of religion.1 22  In like
manner, if a Republican Congress should exclude Democratic
campaign literature from the mails or refuse to carry it on equal
terms with other matter of the same class, there would no less
certainly be a denial of freedom of the press. What the precise
outside limits may be on the power of Congress to make postal
regulations affectin. the two fundamental rights under discus-
sion is a question which is not easy to answer. It is a question,
however, a detailed discussion of which is beyond the limits of
this article.1 23  It may in general be said that postal regulations
excluding matter from the mails or establishing a preferred class
of mail matter and founded upon a sound basis of public policy
cannbt be successfully attacked under the first amendment unless
there is manifest in such legislation an intention unjustifiably to
abridge the freedom of religion or of the press or unless such
would be the natural result of its operation.
24
2. Due Process of Law'. While the declaration in the fifth
amendment that Congress shall not deprive any person of life,
liberty, and property without due process of law is less definite
in meaning than the prohibitions upon congressional power which
have just been discussed, it is a no less effective limitation upon
Congress in the exercise of all its delegated powers including the
postal power. It might on casual thought be urged that since the
government is under no obligation to provide any mail facilities
at all for the use of the people, no person could conceivably
cism -among others that it unduly abridged freedom of speech. No case
involving the exclusion of seditious publications from the mails has thus
far been decided by the Supreme Court.
122 "There is not complete religious liberty where any one sect is fav-
ored by the state and given an advantage by law over other sects." Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed.) 663.
123 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, Ch. 12; Rogers, op. cit. 98 ff.
See also Rogers, "Federal Interference with the Freedom of the Press,"
23 Yale Law Journal 559. A valuable discussion of this point is also con-
tained in Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, (1919) 32 Harvard
Law Review 932.
124 "In excluding various articles from the mails, the object of Con-
gress has not been to interfere with the freedom of the press, or with
any other rights of the people; but to refuse its facilities for the distribu-
tion of matter deemed injurious to the public morals." Ex parte Jackson,
(1877) 96 U. S. 727, 24 L. Ed. 877.
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claim that he had been deprived of liberty or property by a statute
which forbade him the right to use the mails for a specified
purpose. This theory rests upon the supposed axiom that the
greater power must include "the lesser; and that the power to
withhold all .mail privileges must therefore include the power to
withhold some or all of those privileges for any reason whatso-
ever or for no reason at all. There is a certain plausibility, to this
argument which arises from the fact that a private person en-
gaged- in a purely private business certainly does possess exactly
this power and may discriminate amongst his patrons or among
those to whom he desires to extend any privilege in any manner
which seems to him desirable.125
It is hardly necessary to point out, however, that the govern-
ment as a dispenser of privileges which may constitutionally be
withheld does not enjoy the arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion
just alluded to. While a person may not be in a position to
compel the government to extend a privilege at all, he does have
a constitutional right to enjoy it on equal terms with others who
stand in the same general relation to the government as he does.
It may not be a "liberty" within the meaning of the due process
clause to be able to mail a letter or a book provided nobody else
can do so. But if the government has created facilities for
mailing letters and books it is a "liberty" within the meaning
of the due process clause to use those facilities on equal terms
with other persons in the same class.12  It is in this sense of the
word that the use of the postal system has been declared to be
part of the "liberty" secured by the fourteenth amendment against
deprivation without due process of law.12 7  In short, the due
process clause operates as a limitation upon the power of Con-
125 A soon as a business comes to take on a public character or be-
comes "affected with a public interest" this arbitrary power of the pro-
prietor to discriminate amongst his patrons ceases to exist.
1
2
6 It seems clear that the "equal protection of the law" or protection
against arbitrary discrimination is an essential part of the guarantee of
due process of law. "Due process of law within the meaning of the
Amendment is secured if the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject
the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."
Giozza v. Tiernan, (1893) 148 U. S. 657, 13 S. C. R. 721, 37 L. Ed. 599.
Freund, Police Power, Sec. 611. See 6 Ruling Case Law, Sec. 367, 437; 12
Corpus Juris 1190.
127 AIlgeyer v. Louisiana, (1897) 165 U. S. 578, 41 L Ed. 832, 17 S.
C. R. 427. Cf. Statement in Hoover v. McChesney, (1897) 81 Fed. 472,
"We think the right to use the mails though in degree much less valuable
than the use of the transportation lines, would be equally a property right,
and one which could not be taken away without due process of law."
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gress to make classifications which are arbitrary in character in
respect to the enjoyment of mail privileges. 2 "
This calls for a brief discussion of what sort of classification
is to be regarded as arbitrary; for quite obviously many classi-
fications are not only legitimate but necessary. While there has
been a great deal of difficulty in deciding in concrete cases the
precise character of the equality of treatment to which persons
are constitutionally entitled, there is substantial agreement with
reference to certain tests by which the validity of statutory
classifications is to be judged. No one will question, in the first
place, that no classification would be constitutional in which the
members of the class singled out for distinctive treatment did
not differ in some substantial manner from those not included in
such class.12 9  Congress is not apt to violate this principle in
classifying mailing privileges. But if one could imagine a re-
quirement that letters going from New York to Chicago should
pay three cents postage while -those going from Chicago to New
York should pay two cents postage, or a requirement that morn-
ing newspapers should enjoy postal privileges denied to evening'
papers, there would be no hesitancy in concluding that such
classifications rested upon no discernible differences between
those inside aid outside the class created. In the second place,
there is equally unanimous agreement that when a class is created
by law, the basis of classification must bear some reasonable
relation to the object sought to be accomplished by the act which
creates it.'30 Congress could not, for example, provide that
newspapers printed in foreign languages should be forbidden to
circulate obscene matter but that papers printed in English should
be exempt from such prohibition. Such discrimination would be
void because the basis of the classification, namely, the language
128 This view is supported by analogy in the rule which restricts the
right of .states or mfinicipalities to discriminate in favor of union labor
employed on public work. This is held a denial of the equal protection
of the law even though no one has a right to work for the state. Miller
v. Des Moines, (1909) 143 Ia. 409, 122 N. W. 226, 21 Ann, Cas. 207. 23
L R. A. (N.S.) 815; Fiske v. People, (1900) 188 Ill. 206, 58 N. E. 985,
52 L. R. A. 291.
129 Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegars, (1907) 207 U. S. 73, 52 L. Ed.
108, 28 S. C. R. 28; Deyol v. Superior Court, (1903) 140 Cal. 476, 74
Pac. 28, 98 A. S. R. 73; Ritchie v. Wyman, (1910) 244 Ill. 509, 91 N. E.
695, 27 L. R. A. (N.S.) 994.
130 American Sugar Refining Co v. Louisiana, (1900) 179 U. S. 89, 45
L. Ed. 102, 21 S. C. R. 43; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Matthews, (1899) "174
U. S. 96, 105, 43 L. Ed. 909, 19 S. C. R. 609; Kane v. Erie R. R. Co.,
(1904) 133 Fed. 681, 67 C. C. A. 653, 68 L. R. A. 788; Chicago, etc., R.
Co. v. Westly, (1910) 178 Fed. 619, 102 C. C. A. 65.
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in which newspapers are printed, bears no relation whatever to
the purpose which the statute seeks to serve, the suppression of
the circulation of indecent matter through the mails. It is not
enough that the distinction which marks the line of classification
is one which may properly be made the basis of class legislation;
there must be a relevancy between the basis of the classification
and the particular purpose of the statute which creates that
classification. 131
These two protections against arbitrary class legislation have,
however, a broader application to the classification of mailing
privileges -than the somewhat extreme illustrations used above
would suggest. It must at all times be borne in mind that the
power which Congress is exercising in setting up these classi-
fications is, after all, the power derived from the clause author-
izing the establishment of post offices and post roads. Statutes
which aim to protect the national health, safety, and morals by
excluding various things from the mails are postal regulations
first and police regulations second. It follows, therefore, that
when a person is forbidden to use the postal service for a certain
purpose, he has a right to demand that the basis of classification
bear a reasonable and substantial relationship not primarily to
the general welfare of the country but to such aspects of the
general welfare of the country as may properly be affected by
Congress in the exercise of its postal power. When the Supreme
Court declared that a postal regulation in order to be constitu-
tional must treat alike "those who stand in the same relation to
the government, ' 132 it meant the "same relation" in respect to
the power of the government to exercise the postal authority and
not in respect to liability to military service, the payment of
federal taxes, or any other irrelevant consideration.
This leads, then, to a brief consideration of what the tests
of relevancy must be between the postal power of Congress and
the classifications of postal privileges which Congress may
set up for the purposes of formulating national public policy and
exercising a national police power. There can be no doubt that
any classification which aimed at the protection of the postal
system from injury or obstruction or was designed to promote
its efficiency would rest upon a basis intimately and immediately
131 State v. Loomis, (1893) 115 Mo. 307, 22 S. W. 350, 21 L. R. A. 789;
State v. Currens, (1901) 111 Wis. 431, 87 N. W. 561, 56 L. R. A. 252.132 Public Clearing House v. Coyne, (1903) 194 U. S. 497, 48 L. Ed.
1092, 24 S. C. R. 789.
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connected with the postal power. It is equally certain that dis-
criminations which sought to protect the public from the circu-
lation through the mails of noxious or dangerous matter or from
the consummation of injurious transactions which thrive on
postal facilities would also bear a definite relation to the postal
power. In neither of these cases could one complain that he had
been subjected to discrimination the basis of which was irrelevant
to the postal power. It is the belief of the writer that Congress
may go still further and may set up classifications in respect to
the use of postal facilities which are based merely upon con-
gressional ideas of public policy when that public policy is one
which is related to the development of functions which a postal
system may naturally and reasonably be expected to perform or
of interests which it may properly be used to promote. The
postal service must be regarded not merely as an agency which
exists for the purpose of performing messenger boy service for
individuals but as an institution which actively and positively
promotes the spread of intelligence as to current affairs, as well
as to other matters of general interest. This is the basis upon
which the special second class mail privileges are to be justified,
although the Supreme Court has expressed its belief that the
conferring of these privileges was "at least in form, a discrimi-
nation against the public generally. "' 33 In other words, the dis-
crimination rested upon a basis definitely related to a public
policy or benefit which it was natural and proper for Congress to
promote through its postal system. It was in this light that the
Supreme Court viewed the regulations imposed upon newspapers
and periodicals by the Newspaper Publicity Act of 1912.134 One
of the provisions of this statute will be discussed at a later
point ;135 but it may be noted here that the prohibitions placed
upon publications enjoying second class mailing privileges against
printing editorial or other reading matter for which money is
received without marking it "advertisement" are regarded by
the Court as part and parcel of the congressional policy that the
privileges thus extended to publications should be used primarily
133 Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, (1913) 229 U. S. 288, 304, 57 L.
Ed. 1190, 33 S. C. R. 867.
It is on this basis that the special mailing privileges accorded liter-
ature for the blind (supra p. 1423) may be sustained: They serve to aid the
dissemination of intelligence amongst a group otherwise restricted in
respect to such advantages.
134 Act of August 24, 1912, 37 Stat. at L. 553.
135 Infra, p. 438.
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for the "dissemination of information regarding current events"
and only incidentally for the circulation of advertising matter.
It is, therefore, the kind. of requirement that may properly be
imposed.386  But should Congress attempt to promote in this
manner a public policy unrelated to the natural and customary
functions and purposes of the postal system, a classification so
founded would be arbitrary and unreasonable and would in con-
sequence violate due process of law,-as well as be an exercise
by Congress of a power not ccnferred by the constitution.
By way of summary it may be suggested that by classifying
the uses to which it will allow the mails to be put, Congress
exercises a generous police power for the protection of the public
welfare from sudh evils as would be fostered and promoted by
an entirely unrestricted use of postal privileges. It also enables
Congress to promote a constructive public policy in respect to
such matters as fall within the range of national interests which
the postal system may properly be expected to serve. In short,
these classifications may be established to prevent the misuse and
to promote the most beneficial use of the postal service. But any
discrimination in respect to mail privileges, no matter how com-
mendable in purpose, which is not based upon some actual dif-
ference between the classes created in their relation not to the
national welfare but to the postal service, would be arbitrary
and unconstitutional.
III. REGULATIONS DENYING THE USE OF MAILS FOR PURPOSES
OF VTIOLATING OR EVADING STATE LAW
It would seem fairly clear that if Congress may with propriety
classify the uses to which the postal system may be put for the
purposes which have just been examined, it would be equally
legitimate to provide that those facilities should not be used for
the purpose of evading or violating state law. Legislation anal-
ogous in character has been sustained as a proper exercise by
Congress of the power to regulate interstate commerce,' m upon
principles applying with equal or greater force to postal power.
The first proposal to adopt such a regulation of the mails
seems to be that made by Calhoun at the time of the famous
136Cf. statement of Cooley: "The power to establish postoffices in-
cludes everything essential to a complete postal system under federal con-
trol and management, and the power to protect the same by providing for
the punishment as crimes of such acts as would tend to embarrass or de-
feat the purpose had in view in their establishment." Principles of Con-
stitutional Law, 95.
137 The Webb-Kenyon Act. See Cushman, 3 MINNESOTA LAW RzviEw
406 ff.
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controversy in 1836 as to the power of Congress to exclude from
the mails incendiary and abolitionist publications.
38 Believing
that the absolute exclusion from the mails of the objectionable
matter would abridge the freedom of the press, Calhoun proposed
it should be made unlawful for any postmaster to receive and
send on through the mails any publication addressed to a desti-
nation in which its circulation was unlawful. It was made a
penal offense to deliver such mail matter to any person not
authorized by the local authorities to receive it.
1
'
9 This bill was
amended so as to make it unlawful for any postmaster to deliver
publications the circulation of which was forbidden by local
law. 40  The bill failed of passage; but the discussions in Con-
gress upon its constitutionality were long and interesting.'
4
'
It has already been seen that the second statute excluding
matter relating to lotteries from the mails confined its prohibition
to "letters or circulars concerning illegal lotteries, so-called gift
concerts, or other similar enterprises."'
1 42  The purpose here
seems to have been to make the illegality of the transmission of
this matter contingent upon the illegality under state law of the
enterprise to which it related. Such transmission would be un-
lawful even though lotteries might not be prohibited either in
the state in which the circulars were mailed or in the state into
which they were sent. In other words, the law would be violated
by sending from one state to another in both of which lotteries
were lawful, matter relating to a lottery in a remote state where
such an enterprise was forbidden. This is not a case, therefore,
in which matter is excluded from the mails because of the ille-
gality of its origin' 4s nor because it is to be used for unlawful
purposes at its destination,' 44 but because the enterprise which
138 On December 2, 1835, President Jackson had sent a message to
Congress urging the passiiig of legislation to prevent the circulation
through the mails in the slave states.of abolitionist literature. It was
felt that such reading matter might stir up slave insurrection. Richard-
son, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, III, 177. This called forth
extended discussion of the entire problem.
239 12 Debates of Cong. 383.
140 12 Debates of Cong. 1720.
'4' 12 Debates of Cong. 26-23, 1103-1108, 1136-1153, 1155-1171. For a
summary of this discussion see Rogers, op. cit., 103-115, Willoughby,
op. cit., II, 786.
142 Act of June &, 1872, 17 Stat. at L. 283.
143 For legislation based' on this principle see the Lacey Act of May
25, 1900, 31 Stat. at L. 188, which excludes from interstate c6mmerce
game killed in violation of state law. See Cushman, op cit., 3 MINNE-
soTA LAv REVIEW 408.
144 As is the case in the Webb-Kenyon Act and the act excluding liquor
advertisements from the mails when addressed to states forbidding their
circulation. See note 146 infra.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
certain states have forbidden is of such a character that it thrives
definitely and immediately upon the circulation through the mails
of matter advertising and promoting it, no matter what the pre-
cise locality may be in which that circulation takes place. The act
would, therefore, seem to fall squarely within the general prin-
ciple of the legislation aimed to prevent the mails being used as
an agency for the Violation of state law.
Finally Congress has applied this same principle in its recent
act making unlawful the sending by mail of liquor advertisements
into states in which it is unlawful to advertise or solicit orders
for intoxicating liquor. 45 While this act differs somewhat from
the Webb-Kenyon Act, the question of its constitutionality prob-
ably would be settled by the doctrine of the case in which the
earlier legislation was sustained.1 46 Its constitutionality has not
thus far been questioned. 4 7
IV. PROPOSALS THAT CONFORMITY TO GENERAL POLICE REGU-
LATIONS BE MADE PRICE OF ENJOYMENT
OF MAIL FACILITIES
In the discussion thus far there have been considered the
various classifications of postal privileges based upon the nature
of the matter excluded or the character of the uses to which the
postal facilities were to be put. A discussion of the police power
which Congress may exercise under the postal clause would be
incomplete without some comment upon the proposals which have
sometimes been made that postal facilities should be withheld
entirely or in large part from persons who would not conform
to various congressional mandates in respect to public policy and
national welfare. It is perfectly obvious that there is a great
difference between forbidding any person to send obscene litera-
ture through the mails and forbidding any person who publishes
145 Act of March 3, 1917, 39 Stat. at L. 1069.
.
4 6 The 'Webb-Kenyon Act made it unlawful to ship intoxicating
liquors in interstate commerce which are "intended, by any persons Inter-
ested therein, to be received, possessqd, sold, or in any manner used" in
violation of the laws of the state of their destination. There was no
penalty, however, for violation; violators merely being placed at the mercy
of the state authorities. Violation of the Liquor Advertisement Act is
made a crime against the United States punishable by fin6 or Imprison-
ment. The validity of the Webb-Kenyon Act was upheld by the Supreme
Court in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry Co., (1917) 242 U.
S. 31, 61 L. Ed. 326, 37 S. C. .R. 180. See, Cushman, op cit., 3 MINNE-
soA LA w RE.mw 406 ff.147 For discussion of power of states to pass laws preventing various
uses of the United States mails, see Rogers, op. cit., Ch. 5.
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obscene literature to use the mails for any purpose whatsoever. In
the first case Congress prevents a misuse of postal facilities; in the
second case Congress withholds postal privileges as a sort of pen-
alty for non-compliance with the congressional policy for the
suppression of obscene literature. It makes conformity to cer-
tain police requirements a condition precedent to the enjoyment
of the use of the mails.
While no statute of this type has yet been passed by Congress,
the desirability of enacting such laws has more than once been
urged in recent years by those whose views as to the constitu-
tional propriety of such legislation should be accorded respectful
consideration. Perhaps the most conspicuous of these proposals
and the one most widely discussed was the one made by the Pujo
Money Trust Committee in 1913. This congressional committee
proposed as a means of regulating and controlling stock exchange
speculation "that Congress prohibit the transmission by the mails
or by telegraph or telephone from one state to another of orders
to buy or sell quotations or other information concerning trans-
actions on any stock exchange, unless such exchange shall be a
body corporate of the state or territory in which it is located"
and unless it comply with other specified conditions.1 48 While
the denial of mail privileges herein proposed was not absolute,
it was nevertheless very substantial. The substance and effect of
the proposed law was to penalize stock exchanges which refused
to incorporate under the laws of any state by denying them mail
privileges which were accorded to others. One writer has pro-
posed a law similar in principle which would exclude from the
mails papers of any corporation which refused to make full re-
ports to the federal government respecting those aspects of its
affairs in regard to which Congress desired full publicity. 49
Dean J. P. Hall expresses the view that "as a last resort, Con-
gress might deny the privileges of the mails to businesses, which,
though operating wholly within a state, persisted in practices that
Congress within a reasonable discretion saw fit to disapprove." 150
148 Majority Report of the Committee to Investigate the Concentra-
tion of Money and Credit (February 28, 1913).
See Rogers, op. cit., 161 ff.
349 Pamm, Powers of Regulation Vested in Congress, (1910) 24 Harv.
L. Rev. 77.
15o This view is based on the authority of the Lottery Cases which
Dean Hall says rested upon the ground that "Congress could regulate
interstate commerce for any purpose not forbidden by the constitution,
not merely for purposes granted by the constitution," (1912) 20 Journal of
Political Economy 473.
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Mr. Bryan, in a newspaper debate with Senator Beveridge in
1907, in which he appeared as the champion of states rights, ex-
pressed the belief that Congress could properly deny all mail priv-
ileges to monopolistic corporations or trusts.'5 1 In the autumn
of 1918 two bills were introduced into Congress providing for a
similar denial of postal privileges to those vho employed chil-
dren below a certain age.152
At the outset of any discussion of the constitutionality of
this type of legislation, it would probably be admitted that Con-
gress could deny mail privileges to persons as a penalty for crime.
If Congress may constitutionally punish a criminal by depriving
him of his citizenship, surely it could impose the lesser penalty
of taking away a specific incident to that citizenship. It would
make no difference what the offense was which was so punished,
provided only that Congress had the constitutional authority to
prohibit it and provided the denial of mail privileges was im-
posed as other criminal penalties are imposed after conviction in
a court having jurisdiction. The imposition of such a penalty in
any other manner would, of course, be a denial of liberty and
property without due process of law. It would clearly be a typ&
of authority which could not be delegated to an administrative
officer. 53 It may have been this rule which prompted the cau-
tious language of the Supreme Court in sustaining the power
conferred upon the postmaster general to refuse to deliver reg-
istered mail matter to persons shown to be using the mails for
fraudulent purposes. The law authofized the withholding of all
such mail, and not merely such as pertained to the fraudulent
transactions. After commenting on the practical impossibility
of determining whether sealed mail matter is innocent or not,
the court went on to say :15'
"It is true it may occasionally happen that he [the post-
master general] would detain a letter having no relation to the
151 "Congress -has power to. control interstate commerce, and the decis-
ion of the Supreme Court in the Lottery -Case leaves little doubt that that
power can be so exercised as to withdraw the interstate railroads and tele-graph lines and the mails from the corporafions which control enough of
the product of any article to give them an actual monopoly." The Reader,
Vol. 9, p. 356.
152 Sen. bills 4732, 4760, June 27, 1918, introduced by Mr. Kenyon.
Cong. Rec., Vol. 56, 8341.
15SInterstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, (1894) 154 U. S.
447, 485, 38 L. Ed. 1047, 14 S. C. R. 1125, 155 U. S. 3, 39 L. Ed. 49;
Wong Wing v. United States, (1896) 163 U. S. 228, 234) 41- L. Ed. 140, 16S. C. R. 977; Whitcomb's Case, (1876) 120 Mass. 118, 21 Am. Rep. 502.
'5'Public Clearing House v. Coyne, (1903) 194 U. S. 497, 48 L. Ed.
1092, 24 S. C. R. 789.
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prohibited business; but where a person is engaged in an enter-
prise of this kind, receiving dozens and perhaps hundreds of
letters every day containing remittances or correspondence con-
nected with the prohibited business, it is not too much to as-
sume that, prima facie, at least, all such letters are identified
with such business. . . . Whether, in case a private registered
letter was thus seized and detained, and damage was thereby
occasioned to the addressee, an action would lie against the post-
master general, is not involved in this case."
The Court seemed to view with disfavor a construction of
the law which would place in the hands of an administrative
officer the power to deny to a person the right to receive innocent
mail matter because he was found to be using the mails for for-
bidden purposes. Such a power would savor of the imposition of
a penalty for crime by the postmaster general, whereas crime
can legally be punished only by a court of law.'5 5 It is the belief
of the writer that the power exercised by the postmaster gen-
eral to exclude permanently from second class mail privileges
publications in the issues of wvhich'he has found non-mailable
matter within the meaning of the -Espionage Act, is open to
various serious questions on the grounds just mentioned. It is
one thing to allow an administrative officer the power to exclude
non-mailable publications; it is a very different thing to allow
him to keep on excluding the subsequent issues of such publi-
cations when in actual fact they might prove to be innocent in
character. "" Such procedure raises, to say the least, a very
close question of due process of law.
With such legislative proposals as those mentioned at the
beginning of this section, however,--laws in which the denial of
mail privileges is imposed as a penalty for acts of omission or
commission which Congress has no power to punish directly,--the
155 A like construction would presumably apply to the clause of the
Espionage Act c6nferring similar authority upon the postmaster general.156 The grounds upon which the postmaster general bases the propriety
of his action in these cases are set forth by him as follows: "To be a
'newspaper or other periodical publication' within the meaning of the law
governing second-class matter a publication must among othyer require-
ments, be composed in its entirety of mailable matter. A publication
containing matter which is nonmailable is not a 'newspaper or other
periodical publication' within the meaning of the law and therefore is not
entitled to the second-class mail privilege. In administering the law
governing second-class matter it has been found necessary to revoke the
second-class mail privilege of some publications for the reason that their
contents consisted more or less of matter which was nonmailable and
which, therefore, removed them from the class of publications entitled
under the law to that privilege." Report of the Postmaster General, 1917,
p. 65.
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question of constitutionality assumes a very different form. This
is not so much the imposing of a penalty in the technical sense
of the word as the setting up of an antecedent or even a con-
tinuing condition as the price of the enjoyment of mail privi-
leges. The price of the privilege of using the mails is the aban-
donment of child labor, or the cessation of monopolistic
practices, or the filing of reports regarding corporate business
and activities. The test in the light of which the validity of these
acts must be judged is, in the last analysis, the relevancy of the
conditions thus imposed to the postal power and the interests and
functions for the promotion of which that power may be used.
This seems to be the test applied by the Supreme Court to
the provision of the Newspaper Publicity Act of 1912 which
denies the privileges of the mails to publications which fail to
comply with the requirements of the law in respect to printing
semi-annually certain facts respecting their ownership and con-
trol.lr In passing upon the validity of this act, the Supreme
Court, after holding that the denial of mail privileges mentioned
should be construed to mean second class privileges only, pointed
out that the condition imposed on the publishers was intimately
connected with the purposes for which second class mail privi-
leges had been created and that it was within the scope of the
postal power to extend those privileges "upon condition of com-
pliance with regulations deemed by that body incidental and
necessary to the complete fruition of the public policy lying at
the foundation of the privileges accorded."' 58  The implication
is clear that if the condition thus imposed had not been thus
related to the public policy which Congress under the postal
power could properly promote, it would have been void.'59
If the conditions thus imposed as the price of the enjoyment
of mail privileges are not thus relevant to the purposes of the
postal power, as would seem to be the case with the proposed
child labor law, the statutes creating them could be attacked
157 Act of August 24, 1912, 37 Stat. at L. 553.
'
58 Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, (1913) 229 U. S. 288, 57 L. Ed.
1190, 33 S. C. R. 867.
15' The brief for the government had alleged that Congress possessed
the most arbitrary power to classify mail privileges. See supra, note 197.
The court concludes its opinion in this .case with the following statement:
"Finally, because there has developed no necessity of passing on that
question, we do not wish even by the remotest implication to be regarded
as assenting to the broad contentions concerning the existence of arbi-
trary power through the classification of the mails, or by way of con-
dition, embodied in the proposition of the government which we have
previously stated."
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upon two grounds. It .could be urged, in the first place, that
such laws were not in reality exercises of the postal power at
all because the use of the mails has nothing whatever to do with
the evil of the child labor which it is the object of the legislation
to remedy 6 0 In the second place, such a statute would fail to
meet the tests of due process of law. What has already been
said upon the subject of due process of law in its application to
arbitrary classifications of mail matter"6" would apply with equal
force to the classifications established by the acts now Eeing con-
sidered. When persons are classified in respect to their privileges
in the mails upon the basis of their employment or non-employ-
ment of children, they may properly urge that that classification
is arbitrary and a denial of due process of law. It may further
be suggested that the Supreme Court has declared in a well
known casei' 2 that a person is deprived of due process of law
by being obliged to -sacrifice a constitutional right as the price
of securing a privilege which the government might withhold
entirely in its discretion. This principle would seem to be ap-
plicable by way of analogy to the case of one who, as a condition
of enjoying the privileges of the mails which Congress need not
extend to any one, is required to do something which Congress
could not make him do, or cease doing something which Con-
gress could not forbid. 63  It is the belief of the writer that the
Supreme Court would not hesitate to declare such legislation
unconstitutional on either or both of the grounds which have
been mentioned.
CONCLUSION
It seems clear from the foregoing analysis that the postal power
is one which may be wielded very effectively by Congress for
the police purposes. That power extends to the adequate pro-
tection of the postal service from injury; it extends to the pro-
tection of the public from the various dangerous or harmful
160 It was urged by the proponents of the Keating-Owen Act that there
was a substantial relationship between child labor and interstate com-
merce for the reason .that child labor "feeds" on interstate commerce and
is stiinulated thereby. For discussion of this point, see Cushman, op.
cit., 3 MINNESOTA LAW REVIV 471 ff. The connection between child
labor and interstate commerce and the postal system is certainly much
less substantial than between child labor afid interstate commerce.
16 1 Supra, p. 427.
162 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, (1910) 216 U. S. 1, 54 L.
Ed. 355, 30 S. C. R. 355.
163 For development of this point, see Green, The Child Labor Law
and the Constitution, Illinois Law Bulletin, April, 1917, p. 17; also Beck,
Nullification by Indirection, (1910) 23 Harv. L. Rev. 441.
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uses to which mail privileges may be put; it extends to the pro-
motion of positive public policies related to the-broad purposes for
which the postal system exists; it extends to the withholding of
postal privileges as a means of inducing persons to conform to
reasonable requirements and regulations incidental to the privi-
leges of the mails. But as soon as Congress begins to use its
postal power as a lever or a club to compel people to do things
or refrain from doing things which have no real or intimate
relation to the postal system or any of the larger purposes
which may properly be promoted by it, the line of constitu-
tionality has been crossed and Congress has exceeded its powers.
In exercising a police power under the postal clause, as under
the powers to tax and to regulate commerce, the ultimate test
of constitutionality must be, not whether the police regulation
established is necessary or desirable for the protection of the
national health, safety, or morals, but whether the evil which
Congress is combatting has any real and practical connection with
the particular delegated power which Congress is employing.
Any other consttuction of the authority of Congress to exercise
a police power would destroy the whole force of the doctrine of
delegated national powers and allow Congress by a process of the
most obvious indirection to deal with problems of purely local
welfare.
ROBERT EUGENE CUSH MAN.
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